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Abstract: The main purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of accrual information 
to stock valuation. Managing earnings using income-increasing strategy cause stock to 
be overvalued.Using Indonesian data, this study selects companies that produce positive 
discretionary accrual. Those companies are assumed managing earnings trough income-
increasing strategy based on Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al.,1995) and Kasznik 
Model (1999). Based on the findings, our conclusions are (1) income-increasing strategy 
negatively affects stock value, and (2) income-increasing strategy using receivable 
positively affects stock value. This study is expected to contribute to earnings management 
and overvaluation studies, especially in emerging market.
Keywords: Discretionary accrual, overvaluation, and income-increasing strategy.
1. INTRODUCTION
Assessing the usefulness of accounting information has become an important goal 
of accounting research. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the impact 
of accrual information to stock valuation. We believe that earnings information is 
used by investors, in which investors usually evaluate companies using the bottom 
line of income statement. Based on this phenomena, companies also use earnings 
information to attract investors’ attention.
Earnings announcements studies conclude that earnings information generate 
investors’ reaction (Ball and Brown, 1968; Beaver 1968; Jegadeesh and Titman, 
1993; Francis et al., 2002; Landsman et al., 2012). The finding of Mrying (2006) 
supports the existence of a relationship between earnings and returns in all 
accounting regimes around the world. Because of market’s reaction is considered 
so important, companies avoid reporting disappointed earnings.Managers avoid 
earnings losses (decrease) (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997), and instead, they try to 
meet or beat earnings expectation (Bartov et al. 2002) to get positive reaction. This 
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strategy is used by managers because investors provide rewards (punishments) 
for companies that deliver positive (negative) earnings surprise by producing 
positive (negative) stock return. Bad news generate bigger magnitude reaction 
than good news. It means that companies get more severe punishment in bad 
news because of asymmetry reaction on earnings announcements (Skinner and 
Sloan 2002; Conrad et al, 2002).
Based on companies’ perspective, investors’ attention on earnings stimulates 
them to conduct earnings managements. Managers understand that investors are 
fixated by earnings information (Sloan, 1996). To achieve their goals, managers 
manage earnings so that investors may react in accordance with the will of 
managers.
Managing earnings using income increasing strategy stimulate overvaluation 
on stock. Market participants generate stock price higher than its fair value. 
Managing earnings upwards is responded by investors trough more positive 
reaction. Naïve investors who suffer accounting fixation overreact, because people 
tend to weigh recent information (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985). Analysts who 
produce recommendation for investors also overreact (DeBondt and Thaler, 1990). 
Those phenomena describe why stock is overvalued because of income increasing 
activities. This study predicts that income-increasing activities stimulate stock 
value.
Our results provide evidence that earnings management through income-
increasing strategy produce lower stock value. It indicates that income-increasing 
strategy decreases stock value. However, after using increasing receivable and 
revenue as moderating variable, the findings are different. Companies that 
increase accrual trough increasing receivable reverse the impact of discretionary 
accrual to price to book value. It means that earnings management through income 
increasing strategy boost stock value when companies use increasing receivable to 
increase earnings.
This research contributes to the accounting theory and investment strategy 
literatures. The first contribution, this study builds a bridge between earnings 
managements and overreaction studies. The behavior of managers to increase 
earnings affects irrational behavior of investors. Second, this study presents 
evidence from an emerging market perspective, especially in Indonesian stock 
market. In Indonesia, companies tend to produce low earnings quality compared 
to other countries (Fan and Wong, 2002), especially developed stock market 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2003). Bhattacharya et al. (2003) also present earnings opacity 
ranking that represents earnings aggressiveness, loss avoidance, and earnings 
smoothing. The use of Indonesian data to analyze the impact of income increasing 
activities to stock valuation is contextual.
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This article is divided into several sections. The next section reviews the 
literature to build our hypothesis. Section 3 describes details about data and 
methodology. Section 4 discussesthe results and present supplementary analysis. 
In the final sections, we present conclusions.
2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Accruals Accounting
Transactions are not only recorded based on cash flow but also based on economic 
events. That is the reason we need accrual accounting. Accrual is the difference 
between earnings and operating cash flow. Accrual basis is used in accounting 
practice because it has greater ability to predict companies’ future performance 
(Kim and Kross, 2005). It is considered better than operating cash flow in evaluating 
companies performance because of timing and matching issues (Dechow et 
al.,1995). 
Even though accrual is considered better than cash flow, it should be 
realized that accrual leaves rooms for managements’ judgment and subjectivity. 
Jones (1991) and Dechow et al. (1995) divides accruals into two parts, namely 
nondiscretionary accruals and discretionary accruals. Discretionary accrual can be 
controlled by management, therefore it is important to understand that earnings 
are the results of extensive accounting choices, estimates and judgments that could 
affect the reported results. This discretion of manager, combined with managers’ 
motivations, stimulate earnings management. 
Managers set earnings based on their goal. Managersmay manipulate earnings 
upward or downward depend on their motivation. Stockholders expect that 
company’s share is increase continuously. Debt covenant also affect managements 
behavior. In order to avoid debt covenant violations managers need to improve 
their performance. Stockholders and creditors always encourage managers to 
improve market value of the company for their best interest. In dealing with these 
pressures, managers tend to use income-increasing strategy to boost stock price. 
Earnings reported by firms generate price reaction because of investor reaction 
to the news. Positive (negative) earnings surprises are good (bad) news that 
produces positive (negative) reaction. This is a pressure for managers to present 
increasing earnings to meet market expectation. Barth et al. (1995) give evidence 
that companies with consistent earnings improvement present higher P/E ratio. 
That ratio will be higher along with the increase in earnings and it will be eliminated 
when the increase of the earnings pattern is broken. Supporting Barth et al. (1995), 
DeAngelo et al. (1996) also document that the company will experience negative 
abnormal return if no longer report earnings growth. 
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The Impact of Accrual to Overvaluation
Accounting researches suggest that investors fixate on accounting information 
(Luft and Shields, 2001). Investors may unable to change their decision process 
in response to change in accounting process which supply them with decision 
data. Investors only focus on bottom line information, while different accounting 
methods produce different earnings. Most of investors, especially naïve investors 
do not process those differences. To boost companies’ stock prices, managers 
exploit investors’ bias for their own interest. Managers try to stimulate stock 
valuation by increasing income because they know that investors use net income 
as their main information.
Aggresiveness in earnings recognition mislead stock valuation (Chan et al., 
2001). Investors (and analysts) overreact to earnings information (DeBondt and 
Thaler, 1985 and 1990) and stock prices become overvalued. Investors experience 
functional fixation and does its stock price. This study believes that upward bias 
of earnings generates upward bias on stock price. So, increasing earnings causes 
overvalued stocks. Based on that, we predict the hypothesis stated below:
H1: Earnings management through income-increasing strategy leads to over-
valuation of stock.
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Sample and Data
This research uses Indonesian data. Indonesia is an emerging country. Based 
on Fang and Wong (2002) and Landsman et al. (2012), companies in Indonesia 
produce lower earnings informativeness than those in other countries. These 
phenomenon improve contextual aspect of this study. Although earnings quality 
is low, we believe that investors still analyze how companies boost earnings. 
When investors use (do not use) earnings, they may (may not) react to earnings-
management strategy. That is the reason why this study is important. The duration 
of the study is three years starting from 2010 to 2012. Because this study focuses 
on income-increasing strategy, we only use companies that produce positive 
discretionary accrual. In estimating discretionary accrual we use all available data 
from Indonesian Stock Exchange in each year.
Discretionary Accruals
We use discretionary accruals as a proxy of earnings management. We use two 
models of discretionary accruals, there are (1) Modified Jones Model (Dechow et 
al. 1995) and (2) Kasznik Model (1999).
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1.	 Modified	Jones	Model	(Dechow	et	al.	1995)
First of all, we use the following model in the estimation period:
TAt = a1 (1/At-1) + a2(∆REVt) + a3 (PPEt) + ut ………………………………………(1)
TAt = Total Accruals in year t (calculated as Net income year t – Cash flow From 
Operation year t)
a1, a2, and a3 indicate the OLS estimation of α1, α2 and α3 for Non-Discretionary 
Accruals using the following regression model:
NDAt = α1(1/At-1) + α2(∆REVt–∆RECt) + α3 (PPEt) …………………………… (2)
Whrere:
∆REVt = revenue in year t less revenue in year t-1
∆RECt = account receivable in year t less account receivable in year t-1
PPEt = gross property, plant and equipment in year t
At-1  = total asset at the beginning of the period
α1, α2, α3 = firm-specific parameters
Discretionary Accruals (DA) derived from the following equation:
DAt = TAt – NDAt ………………………………………………………………… (3)
All variables are scaled by total asset at the beginning of period (At-1).
2.	 Kasznik	Model	(1999)
The step for calculating discretionary accruals using Kasznik Model (1999) 
derived from Jones Model (1991), but in addition Kasznik adjusts the model by 
considering Cash Flow from Operation:
TAt = a1 (1/At-1) + a2(∆REVt–∆RECt) + a3 (PPEt) + a4 (∆CFOt) + et …………..….(4)
NDAt = α1(1/At-1) + α2(∆REVt–∆RECt) + α3 (PPEt) + α4(∆CFOt) ……………… (5)
DAt =TAt – NDAt …………………………………………………………....…… (6)
Where:
∆CFOt  = change in Cash Flow from Operation in period t (calculated as 
    CFO year t less CFO year t-1)
All variables are scaled by total asset at the beginning of the year (At-1).
Hypothesis Testing
In testing the hypothesis, we use this regression model:
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PBVt,i = α1 + α2 DACCt,i + α3 SIZEt,i + α4 DYEAR + et……....…………………..(7)
Where:
PBVt,i            =  Price to book ratio of company i year t.
DACCt,1 = Discretionary accruals company i year t. That is a proxy for 
   earnings management. In this study we use model from Modified 
  Jones (Dechow et al. 1995) and Kaznik (1999).
FSIZE =  Natural logarithm of total asset t-1.
DYEAR =  Dummy variable to control year effect.
To expand the analysis, this study also use additional important variables, 
those are dummy variables of increasing revenue and receivable. This model is 
needed to capture the impact of discretionary accrual to stock valuation based on 
PBV.
PBVt,i = β1 + β2 DACCt,i + β3 SIZEt,i + β4 DYEAR + β5 DREVt,i + β6 DRECt,i + 
  β7 DREV* DACCt,i +β8 DREC* DACCt,i +et ……...………………..(8)
DREV (DREC) is an indicator variable that equal to one if company presents 
increasing revenue (receivable), and zero if it report decreasing revenue (receivable). 
DREV (DREC) becomes moderating variables that will affect the relation between 
DACCt,I and PBVt,i.
4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Data description is presented in Table 1 below.
Table 1 
Initial data based on the availability Descriptive Statistics
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
PBV 404 -58.66 135.18 2.463094059 8.01596534
LNASS 447 20.61906935 32.66485848 27.67026608 1.647318241
DADECHOW 447 9.24742E-05 7.122432252 0.132002306 0.415041837
DAKAZNIK 253 0.000411561 4.77120945 0.116843939 0.316370175
Only 5 companies report negative PBF because of negative equities.
In regression prosess several data is eliminated because of unstandardized error is more than two 
times above (below) its mean.
Table 2 provides the regression result of equation 7 to test the hypothesis. Table 
2 shows the result for hypothesis testing using two discretionary accruals methods 
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– Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995) and Kasznik Model (1999) as a proxy 
of earnings management. By using Modified Jones Model, DACC has negative 
significant impact to PBV. This result indicates that the higher discretionary 
accruals lead to negative reaction from the market, in which market participants 
value the stock lower than it should be. By using Kasznik Model (1999), the impact 
of discretionary accruals is insignificant to PBV. These results indicate that the 
impact of discretionary accruals to PBV is inconsistent across the model used. 
In conclusion, income increasing through discretionary accruals cannot boost 
positive reaction from the market. H1 is not supported. 
Table 2 
Regression Result of the impact of earnings management to stock valuation 
PBVt,i = α1 + α2 DACCt,i + α3 SIZEt,i + α4 DYEAR + et
Modified Jones Model (n=374) Kaznik Model (n=212)
 Coefficients t value sig. Coefficients t value sig.
(Constant) -5.996 -2.741 *** -15.300 -4.565 ***
DACC -0.838 -2.986 *** 0.530 0.885 n.s
DYEAR10 0.246 0.744 n.s -0.003 -0.006 n.s
DYEAR11 -0.164 -0.576 n.s 0.491 0.658 n.s




F-test        8.657 <0.001         6.960 <0.001
Dependent variable is PBVt,i. PBVt,Iis Price to book ratio of company i year t; 
DACCt,1is Discretionary accruals company i year t, using Modified Jones Model 
(Dechow et al. 1995) and Kaznik Model (1999); FSIZE isnatural logarithm of total 
asset DYEAR is dummy variable to control year effect.
The study also examine the impact of discretionary accruals to stock price, using 
increasing revenue (DREVACC) and increasing account receivable (DRECACC) as 
moderating variables. We use dummy variable 1 to label increasing in revenue or 
receivable, and zero otherwise. The result of this test is shown in Table 3.
In table 3, it is shown that discretionary accruals by using Modified Jones 
Model still affect PBV negatively. In Kasznik Model, discretionary accruals do not 
affect PBV significantly. The rest of the variables in table 3, by using Modified 
Jones Model and Kasznik Model have the same result. Increasing revenue (DREV), 
increasing receivable (DREC) and the interaction between increasing revenue and 
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discretionary accruals (DREVACC) do not give significant impact to price to book 
ratio (except for DREV using Modified Jones Model that is significant at 5%).
Table 3 
Regression Result Using Increasing Revenue and Increasing Receivable  as 
Moderating Variable
PBVt,i = β1 + β2 DACCt,i + β3 SIZEt,i + β4 DYEAR + β5 DREVt,i + β6 DRECt,i +
β7 DREV* DACCt,i +β8 DREC* DACCt,i +et
Dechow Model (n=374) Kaznik Model (n=210)
Coefficients t value sig. Coefficients t value sig.
(Constant) -5.380 -2.489 *** -10.259 -3.529 ***
DACC -1.344 -4.062 *** -3.232 -1.263 n.s
DYEAR10 0.435 1.332 n.s 0.101 0.286 n.s
DYEAR11 -0.214 -0.752 n.s 0.824 1.317 n.s
LNASS 0.244 3.131 *** 0.430 4.137 ***
DREV 0.763 2.035 ** 0.317 0.628 n.s
DREC 0.215 0.606 n.s 0.357 0.786 n.s
DREVACC -2.310 -1.272 n.s -0.831 -0.277 n.s
DRECACC 3.864 2.112 ** 4.490 1.865 **
Adjusted R 
Square
        0.123          0.119
F-test 7.575 <0.001 4.533 <0.001
Dependent variable is PBVt,i. PBVt,Iis Price to book ratio of company i year t; 
DACCt,1is Discretionary accruals company i year t, using Modified Jones Model 
(Dechow et al. 1995) and Kaznik Model (1999); FSIZE isnatural logarithm of 
total asset DYEAR is dummy variable to control year effect. DREV (DREC) is 
an indicator variable that equal to one if company presents increasing revenue 
(receivable), and zero if it report decreasing revenue (receivable).
Interesting result comes from the interaction between increasing receivable and 
accruals (DRECACC), in which the result indicates that DRECACC has positive 
and significant impact to PBV. This result is consistent across both models. So, it 
can be concluded that earnings management through receivable component can 
reverse the coefficient of discretionary accruals that used to be negative, turns to 
be positive after the interaction.
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From this result it can be concluded that receivable has strong predictive power 
to income increasing strategy. This result confirms Chan et al. (2001) in which firms 
with higher accruals tend to display increases in receivable and also receivable 
are relatively easy to manipulate. This result implies that the effort to increase 
earnings stimulate higher stock price if the firm uses receivable component in their 
earnings management strategy.
From those two equations to test the hypothesis, SIZE as a controlling 
variable,consistently shows positive and significant impact to PBV. This result 
suggests that there is a tendency that the higher the size of the company, the 
manager will increase reported earnings. The reason is the higher the scale of 
the firm, the more pressure that the manager has to meet or even beat market 
expectation. This result is consistent with Barton and Simko (2002)and Kim et al. 
(2003).
CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the literature, we build empirical tests of the relation between earnings 
management through income-increasing strategy to stock valuation. Our results 
provide evidence that earnings management through income-increasing strategy 
negatively affects stock value. It indicates that income-increasing strategy is not 
able to boost stock value. Conversely, that strategy decreases it. 
Earnings management through income-increasing strategy can be done 
by managing receivable or revenue. Using that idea, this study uses increasing 
revenue and receivable as moderating variable. The findings show that income-
increasing strategy using increasing receivable reverse the sign of regression 
coefficient. Earnings management through income-increasing strategy positively 
affects stock value when companies use receivable to increase income.
Based on the findings, our conclusions are (1) income-increasing strategy 
negatively affects stock value, and (2) income-increasing strategy using receivable 
positively affects stock value. Those findings answer the question of the title of 
this article in different ways. First, in average, we cannot boost stock value using 
income-increasing strategy. Second, in average, we can boost stock value using 
income-increasing strategy when companies use receivable to increase earnings.
This study is expected to contribute to earnings management studies and 
overreaction studies. Overreaction studies present that investors overreact to 
earnings information. This study explains an important factor of overvaluation; 
that is earnings management trough income increasing strategy using receivable.
There are several limitations of this study. The duration of the study should be 
expanded. Nevertheless, this study already controls years in the regression and the 
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findings show that years are not crucial factor in examining the relation between 
income-increasing strategy and stock valuation. This study also may be developed 
by using future return. When presenting higher accrual to boost current stock 
value, stock price of companies are overvalued. Based on overreaction hypothesis, 
that condition will produce reverse action of market participants in the subsequent 
periods. DeBondt and Thaler (1985 and 1990) present overreaction phenomenon. 
The use of accrual will be a substantial development to explain overreaction 
phenomenon.
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